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1. INTRODUCTION
The unemployment insurance system is one of the public policies with major influence in the labour
market, in the sense that conditions the workers’ reservation wage and their search behaviour for a
new job.
Within this context, there are several labour economics theories that attempt to explain the existence
of a significant relationship betweendecisions by individuals on job take-up and howgenerous the un-
employmentinsuranceis. The Job SearchModel
1 is oneof the theoreticalmodelsthat tryto explainin-
dividualjobdecisionsthroughthe reservationwageconcept,incorporatingthe fact that unemployment
benefits affect the opportunity cost of workers. This theoretical approach shows that the existence of
income during the unemployment spell reduces the search intensity for a new job and increases the
minimum wage at which individuals are willing to work. This means that unemployment spells are
longer for those on benefit.
The aim of the present study is to investigate how changes in the Portuguese unemployment insur-
ance scheme affected the behaviour of the unemployed on benefit, to this end an analysis was under-
taken of two legislative reforms to the unemployment compensation system.
The first reform wasenactedon 1 July1999and made unemploymentbenefits more generous,both in
terms of value and in terms of maximum entitlement period. We intend to assess the effect of this re-
form ontherelationshipbetweenlongermaximumentitlementperiodsandthelengthof insuredunem-
ployment spells. The economy and labour market in 1999, were suitable for such an assessment
because that period was characterized by strong economic growth and a decreasing unemployment
rate. The later reached historical low values, although long-term unemployment was still high when
compared withothers Europeancountries. This implies that the impact of the legislativechangeon the
duration of insured unemployment was probably not significantly contaminated by changes in the
economy.
Amore informative approach, according to Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimueller(2004), consists in mea-
suring the joint effect of simultaneous changes in the twomain unemploymentinsuranceparameters –
replacement rate and maximum entitlement period – and separate this into two effects as if each
change was carried out individually. There were, however, problems on two sides: the quality of infor-
mation meant that this approach was not viable, and there was no change in the replacement rate sig-
nificant enough to justify in-depth analysis.
The second reform was implemented in 2003 and introduced a set of temporary measures, operating
in tandem withexisting legislation. This package wasknownas the Employmentand Social Protection
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(1) For a description of the model see Mortensen (1970).Programme (ESPP). One of the salient features of this programme was the lowering of the legal age
giving the right to a retirement pension. It was extremely likely that this would influence the behaviour
of insured unemployedwith longer contribution periods. To check this relationship we assess possible
changes in the pattern of workers aged 45 years old or over entering the unemployment benefit
scheme.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the unemployment insurance system
andthe 1999and2003legislativechanges.In section3 wecharacterizethe data set used.In section4
we assess how the 1999 legislative change affected the duration of insured unemployment spells.
Section 5 provides an assessment of individual reaction to the possibility of lowering the retirement
age. Section 6 sets out the conclusions.
2. A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
In Portugal, the unemployment insurance system is characterised by the payment of a fixed amount
duringalimitedperiodof time. This isdependent,inthemost commonform, ontheclaimant’s previous
income. These payments have two objectives: to encourage the creation of self employment and to
compensate the individuals for the lack of income due to unemployment.
Act 79-A/89 of 13 March 1989 regulated the eligibility to unemployment benefits until 1 July 1999. On
thisdate,anewactcameontothestatutebooks.The 1989legalframeworkstatedthatincomesupport
due to unemployment was available to all individuals in involuntary unemployment with capacity and
availabilityto work.The incomesupportwasgrantedthroughtwotypesof monthlypayments, duefrom
the claim date: unemployment benefit (UB) and unemployment social benefit. The entitlement to un-
employment payments was for anyone unemployed who fulfilled certain conditions – previous contri-
butions requirement and means test condition. They also had to be registered in their local area
employment office.
The UB was geared to individuals with longer and more regular contributions. With this type of unem-
ployment insurance, an unemployed individual could draw a monthly payment equal to 65% of their
last income, provided that the individual had paid social security contributions at least during 18
months within the last 2 years before unemployment. The maximum entitlement period depended on
age at unemployment and the upper limit was 30 months (table 1).
The unemployment social benefit was conceived to support survival level unemployed individuals.
Therefore it was dependent on the income level of all family members. The eligibility to this benefit re-
quired a minimum number of contributions to social security of at least 180 days within 1 year before
unemployment and a means test condition that the family income per capita could not be higher than
80% of national minimum wage. This type of unemployment insurance was subdivided into initial un-
employment social benefit (USB), for all individuals who did not qualify for UB, and unemployment so-
cial benefit paid following unemployment benefit (USB-UB), for those whose maximum entitlement
period to UB had exhausted. As in the UB case, the maximum entitlement period depended on unem-
ployed age at claim date (table 1), with the detail that USB-UB recipients were granted with half the
maximum entitlement periods set for UB or USB recipients. There was not one global replacement
rate, for payments, as there was for UB. Here, it was contingent on the number of family members.
In 1999, the 1989 legal framework was changed. The aiming was to follow macroeconomic decisions
to achieve lower unemployment rates and to adjust social protection in unemployment to the labour
market profile at the time. One of the most significant amendments, set out in Act 119/99 of 14 April
1999 and enacted on 1 July 1999, was the change in the maximum entitlement period, specifically for
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surance increased (table 1). The lower limit of the maximum entitlement period changed from 10
months to 12 months and the upper limit to 30 months. The later could be increased by periods of 2
months for unemployed individuals aged 45 or over at unemployment date. These changes were ap-
plied to all three types of benefits, with the proviso that the maximum entitlement period for USB-UB is
half of the periods established.
Another significant change for the study that we intend to carry out was the loweringof the entitlement
age for a retirement pension. The pensionable age, as in the previous act, was 60 years old for all re-
cipients aged 55 years old or over at unemployment. This implicitly required a period of at least 30
months of benefits. The amendment made by the 1999 Act, was that pensionable age could also be
taken as 55 years old for the recipients aged 50 years old or over at unemployment if they had at least
20 years of contributions. This measure was mainly for everyone in long-term unemployment.
It should also be noted that this study did not consider the extensions made in 1996 to the maximum
entitlement period for USB recipients aged between 45 and 54 years at claim date.
In2003,theGovernmentintroducedasetofcomplementarymeasurestothelegalframeworkofsocial
protection in unemployment. These measures, as outlined above, are the ESPP, Act 84/2003. The
change in pensionable age is the only measure whose impact we can assess by comparing it with the
situation set out in the previous legislation. According to this programme, the pensionable age is
brought forwardto 58 for all insured unemployedaged 55 or over at unemploymentdate, had 30 years
of social contributions and had completed a 30 months period of UB or USB.
3. DATA
This study uses information on unemployment insurance recipients from the administrative records of
the National Social Security Institute. The data base, built by the Instituto de Informática e Estatística
da Segurança Social (IIESS), is organized in periods of six months and includes information on the
transfers of unemploymentpayments carried out between1998 and 2004. This information is inherent
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Group Age Group
(a) Maximum Entitlement Period Maximum Entitlement Period Change
(Act 79-A/89) (Act 119/99)
1 < 25 10 months 12 months + 2 months
2 [25,30[ 12 months 12 months no change
3 [30,35[ 15 months 18 months + 3 months
4 [35,40[ 18 months 18 months no change
5 [40,45[ 21 months 24 months + 3 months
6 [45,50[ 24 months 30 months + 2 months
(b) +6a1 4months
7 [50,55[ 27 months 30 months + 2 months
(b) +3a1 1months
8  55 30 months 30 months + 2 months
(b) +0a8months
Table 1
CHANGE IN THE MAXIMUM ENTITLEMENT PERIODS
Notes: (a) Age at insured unemployment date. Age group built according to the maximum entitlement periods division establish by Act 79-A/89. (b) 2 months for each group of 5 years
with contributions within the last 20 years prior to the unemployment.to the benefit, and includes monthlyamount, claim date, number of entitlement daysalreadyfulfilled or
type of unemployment insurance, and there is also information on some individual characteristics of
the recipients, such as age and gender.
The use of administrative data is common practice in empirical studies similar to the one we intend to
carry out. There are twomajor advantages of this data base in comparison withsurvey data: one is the
fact that thereis informationon allinsuredunemployedbetween1998and2004,usefulfor findingboth
the flow and the stock of insured unemployed; and the second is that it allows us to overcome prob-
lems such as non-response or length bias that can cause skewed results.
For the present analysis it is sufficient the information for each unemployment insurance claim gath-
ered in the first and last semester of observation. We therefore built a parallel data base where each
line contains only the relevant information on each unemployment insurance claim. The results, dis-
played below, were obtained from this new data base, containing information on 1 274 612 claims for
unemployment insurance.
In any analysis, the description of some variables through empirical numbers is an important exercise
because it allows for early detection of possible structures and patterns in the information. Thus, table
2 presents elementary statistics for two variables – age and number of entitlement days already ful-
filled – by gender and by type of unemployment insurance. According to these statistics, the unem-
ployed on benefit are on average 37 years old at claim date and remain, on average, out of work and
receiving unemployment insurance over a period slightly longer than one year and two months. By
gender, women claim more in unemployment insurance. This reflects the female participation rate in-
crease and the higher difficulties of this group in entering the labour market, specifically in terms of job
stability.
The proportion of UB claims in the data base is approximately66%, though this showseven so the ex-
istence of a substantial number of USB claims. The less restrictive access to USB in terms of previous
contribution requirements and the possibility of using this type of unemployment insurance repeatedly
to face frequent unemployment periods in between jobs of short duration are factors that may explain
this result. In turn, due to the fact that UB recipients mayextendtheir benefits for an additionaltime pe-
riod, the average insured unemployment duration of the UB recipients is rather longer than the aver-
age insured unemployment duration of the USB recipients (table 2).
Chart 1 presents the annual inflow to insured unemployment between 1998 and 2004 and the evolu-
tion of the quarterly unemploymentrate, using figures from National Statistics Institute (INE). Between
1998 and 2000, the number of new claims for unemployment insurance moves downwardsin spite of
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Unemployment Benefit Unemployment Social Benefit
Variable Statistical Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Age
Mean 39,24 35,42 37,06 41,17 36,37 38,59 34,39 33,83 34,03
Standard Deviation 13,24 11,56 12,46 13,02 11,41 12,42 12,51 11,63 11,97
Duration
Mean 444,56 413,43 426,82 493,39 461,16 476,07 322,55 333,32 329,38
Standard Deviation 357,58 320,82 337,48 380,59 349,84 364,73 254,16 244,99 248,44
Number of
observations
548 219 726 393 1 274 612 391 512 455 189 846 701 156 707 271 204 427 911
Note: (a) Own calculations based on information provided by the Instituto de Informática e Estatística da Segurança Social (IIESS).the fact that the social protection system in unemployment became more generous in 1999. This fall-
ing of the inflow to insured unemployment may be the reflection of improvements in the aggregate la-
bour market conditions that characterized the year of 1999
2. However, the behaviour of the
unemployedin generaldoesnot necessarilydovetailwiththe behaviourof the insuredunemployed,as
pointed out in Katz and Meyer’s (1988) analysis for the USA. Even so, it is clear that the behaviour of
the new insured unemployed flow reveals a very close connection to labour market developments
during the period 1998-2004 (chart 1).
4. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE 1999 LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The empiricalevidenceof thissectionispresentedwithinthecontextof the1999legislativereformand
the aim is to assess the effect of longer maximum benefit entitlement periods on the length of insured
unemploymentspells. For that purpose, in this first part of the empirical workthe selected sample con-
tains all the UB or USB claims put in between 1 January 1998 and 31 October 2002, to a total of 702
434.
In this case, the problem approach follows the methodology used by Ours and Vodopivec (2005) in
“How changes in benefits entitlement affect the duration of unemployment?”.In a first phase therefore
we use the Differences-in-Differences method, which consists of comparing the changes in average
insured unemployment duration between control groups and treatment groups.
The division of the maximum entitlement periods in terms of age (table 1) allowsus to assign the sam-
ple recipients to eight distinct age groups. This fact, addedto the heterogeneouschangesin maximum
entitlement periods means that we can establish two control groups
3 and six treatment groups
4.T o
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Chart 1
ANNUAL FLOW OF NEW UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE CLAIMS AND QUARTERLY
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN 1998 AND 2004
Flow of new unemployment insurance claims
Unemployment rate
(2) See Banco de Portugal Annual Report. 22222 2
(3) Age groups for which there was no change in the maximum entitlement period.
(4) Age groups for which there was a change in the maximum entitlement period.take advantage of the existence of two control groups, group 2 and group 4 (table 1), we established
that the first group would be compared to control group 2, due to the closeness between age classes,
and the remaininggroups wouldbe compared to control group 4. Furthermore, since the legislativere-
form of the unemployment insurance system only applies to unemployment spells starting after 1 July
1999
5, we have in the selected period a group of individuals that do not benefit from the new condi-
tions, which we will name group “before the change”, and a group of individuals for whom the new law
is applicable and which we will name group “after the change”.
Tables3 and4 exhibitaverageinsuredunemploymentdurationbyagegroupfor bothtypesof benefits:
UB and USB. In column (7) there will be found the change in average duration of insured unemploy-
ment spells, showing that average permanence in insured unemployment increases in all treatment
groups, withtheexceptionof group8andgroup3of UBrecipients. The changesinaveragedurationof
insured unemployment spells for control groups can be seen as the result of changes in aggregate la-
bour market conditions, because the maximum entitlement periods inherent to those groups remain
unchanged after the introduction of a new unemployment insurance system. In the light of this, the
change in average insured unemploymentduration of individuals eligible for UB aged between25 and
29 years old suggests a significant improvement in aggregate labour market conditions over the first
yearofinsuredunemployment,whiletheresultsofcontrolgroup4associatedtoUSBrecipientsexhibit
a small deterioration in aggregate labour market conditions, and this willimpact on the other treatment
groups. The remaining changes in average insured unemployment duration associated to control
groups are not statistically different from zero.
In the last column of both tables the “diff-in-diff” estimate is computed assessing the difference be-
tweenthe values in column (7) for the relevant groups. Working on the assumption that changes in ag-
gregate labour market conditionsare similar for all age groups, wecan infer that the last changestems
from the impact of a more generous unemployment insurance system on the average insured unem-
ployment period of recipients. On the whole, the average duration of insured unemployment spells in-
creases in all age groups. The only statistically significant exception occurs in the behaviour of the
duration of insured unemployment spells for individuals aged 55 years old or over. For these recipi-
ents, the legislative reform led to a significant reduction in the average duration of the insured unem-
ployment period. This result does not coincide with what might have been expected, in the sense that
age tends to restrict reinsertion in the labour market. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the
legislative reform in question, included not only changes to the maximum benefit entitlement periods
butalsosetoutthepossibilityofbringforwardretirementageto58.This lastmeasureaffectsthegroup
in analysis and may have led the recipients to stop their benefits earlier. We cannot, however, check
the truthfulness of this statement because we have no information on what happened to recipients
after leaving insured unemployment.
In the set of insured unemployment spells linked to UB the most significant effect of the legislative re-
form can be seen in twodistinct age groups. Recipients aged less than 25 and those aged between50
and 54 remain, on average, 2 more weeks in insured unemployment than in the previous situation,
characterized by less generous benefit entitlement system. In turn, among USB recipients it is the
younger individuals aged no more than 34 whose average spell in insured unemployment is signifi-
cantlylonger.Inthisgrouptheincreaseinaverageinsuredunemploymentdurationisalmost18days.
In short, the breakdown of the results by type of unemployment insurance shows different behaviour
patterns among UB and USB recipients. The empirical evidence points to the fact that a new unem-
ployment insurance system had a greater effect on the average insured unemployment duration of
USB recipients than on the average duration of UB recipients, despite possible seasonal effects asso-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Group 1 < 25 Treatment Average Duration 217,6 220,6 3 13,5
(Standard Deviation) (0,78) (0,53) (0,94) (1,37)
Group 2 [25;30[ Control Average Duration 266,2 255,7 -10,5 -
(Standard Deviation) (0,88) (0,54) (1,03) -
Grupo 3 [30;35[ Treatment Average Duration 332 327,4 -4,6 -2,8
(Standard Deviation) (1,2) (0,74) (1,41) (2,35)
Group 4 [35;40[ Control Average Duration 396,1 394,3 -1,8 -
(Standard Deviation) (1,59) (1) (1,88) -
Group 5 [40;45[ Treatment Average Duration 463,5 466,1 2,6 4,4
(Standard Deviation) (2,02) (1,28) (2,39) (3,04)
Group 6 [45;50[ Treatment Average Duration 547,9 549,7 1,8 3,6
(Standard Deviation) (2,46) (1,59) (2,93) (3,48)
Group 7 [50;55[ Treatment Average Duration 658,4 669,6 11,2 13
(Standard Deviation) (2,77) (1,63) (3,21) (3,72)
Group 8  55 Treatment Average Duration 804,3 787 -17,3 -15,5
(Standard Deviation) (1,62) (1,1) (1,96) (2,72)
Notes: (a) Own calculations based on information provided by the Instituto de Informática e Estatística da Segurança Social (IIESS). (b) Length counted in days.
Table 4











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Group 1 < 25 Treatment Average Duration 188,4 205,2 16,8 17,4
(Standard Deviation) (0,56) (0,44) (0,71) (1,32)
Group 2 [25;30[ Control Average Duration 233,5 232,9 -0,6 -
(Standard Deviation) (0,91) (0,62) (1,11) -
Grupo 3 [30;35[ Treatment Average Duration 276,5 299,6 23,1 17,5
(Standard Deviation) (1,3) (0,99) (1,63) (2,88)
Group 4 [35;40[ Control Average Duration 346 351,6 5,6 -
(Standard Deviation) (1,96) (1,35) (2,38) -
Group 5 [40;45[ Treatment Average Duration 384,7 393,8 9,1 3,5
(Standard Deviation) (2,66) (1,77) (3,2) (3,99)
Group 8  55 Treatment Average Duration 668 630,2 -37,8 -43,4
(Standard Deviation) (3,78) (2,72) (4,66) (5,23)
Notes: (a) Own calculations based on information provided by the Instituto de Informática e Estatística da Segurança Social (IIESS). (b) Length counted sin days.ciated to USB claims. The UB recipients, after exhausting the entitlement period, could extend their
unemploymentinsurance payments for an additional period. This fact may justify the smaller impact of
the 1999 legislative reform on this group, in the sense that the observed results suggest that the addi-
tionaltimeforunemploymentinsuranceisincorporatedintheseindividuals’workingdecisionsfromthe
start.
The findingsfor recipients aged55or overshowa biggerfallinthe averageinsuredunemploymentpe-
riod in USB recipients than in the UB recipients. Assuming that this behaviourresults from the possibil-
ity of claiming retirement pension earlier, this fact is surprising since the general idea is that
unemployed individuals entitled to USB find it more difficult to access retirement pension earlier than
those entitled to UB, particularly because they have made fewer and more irregular contributions.
4.1. Duration Analysis
Subsequently, in order to reach a better understanding of the effects of the 1999 legislative reform, we
completed the non parametric assessment carried out in the previous section, with an analysis on the
durations of insured unemployment spells using an approach based on the Job Search model.
The main variablein the information collected is the length of the period (counted in days)whenthe re-
cipient received unemploymentinsurance. This allowedus to estimate the survival function for each of
the eight age groups in the period before and after the legislative reform. The survival function (S(t)) of
eachagegroupbyperiod,wasestablishedbyusingtheKaplan-Meierestimator
6.This correctsthefact
that there are uncompleted
7 insured unemploymentspells. This function indicates the probabilityof in-
sured unemployment lasting at least t days, and this means that it indicates the probability of recipi-
ents’ permanence in insured unemployment at each time moment.
Note that it is possibleto relate the expecteddurationof insuredunemploymentto the survival function
(Lancaster (1990)) through the following:




this showsthat changes in expected insured unemploymentduration (tables 3 and 4) are due to differ-
ences between survival functions across each period in analysis.
The set of Charts 2 and 3 present the survival curves for each typeof unemploymentinsurance by age
group. The fact that insured unemployed after the 1 July 1999 can count on longer maximum entitle-
ment periodsexplainsthe progressivedivergencebetweensurvival curves alongthe durationdistribu-
tion. It is clear, however, that this extension does not influence the behaviour of recipients with short
insured unemployment spells.
The group of UB recipients aged between 25 and 29 is a group for which the maximum benefit entitle-
ment period did not change. Therefore the differences between the survival functions reflect the
changes in the aggregate labour market conditions, which seems likely to have had an impact on
group 1. The greater the magnitude of these changes, the greater the distance betweensurvival func-
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(6) For details on this estimator see Kaplan and Meier (1958).
(7) Anobservationissaidtobecensoredwhentheinitialmomentand/orthefinalmomentthatestablishestherecordofthedurationisunknown,andtherefore
we can have censure at left and/or at right. An observation is left-censored if the occurrence of the event that establishes the beginning of the duration is
unknown and is right-censored if the occurrence of the event that establishes the ending of the duration is at a moment after the selected period. An
observationiscompleteifisnotcensored.Inthepresentcase,theknowledgeoftheclaimdateforunemploymentpaymentsmeansthatweknowtheexact
moment at which the recipientstarts to be underobservationand this avoids left censor. However, the observationperiodends at 31 December2004and
this implies right censor, but since the insured unemployment spells considered in the sample must have started at around 1 July 1999, the number of
right-censored observations is insignificant (0,006%).tions. In particular, this is the groupthat exhibits the widestdifferencebetweensurvivalcurves of allthe
control groups. The fact that the survival curve in the period after the legislative change is always be-
low the survival curve in the period before the legislative change implies significant improvements in
the labour market conditions for these individuals. These improvements were observed along the
wholeduration distribution and not only during the first year of insured unemployment,as discussed in
the analysis of table 3.
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Chart 2
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Chart 2 (continued)
SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT RECIPIENTS, BY AGE GROUP
Chart 3
SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT SOCIAL BENEFIT RECIPIENTS, BY AGE GROUPAs the remaining control groups of UB and USB do not exhibit significant changes in the aggregate la-
bour market conditions, we can assume that the differences betweensurvival functions for most treat-
mentgroupswillbeexplainedtoagreatextentbythenewunemploymentinsurancesystemadoptedin
1999.
In the younger age groups we can see that insured unemployed under the new unemployment insur-
ance legal frameworkmove to another situation outside insured unemploymentat a significantlylower
rate than unemployed individuals in the old system, especially USB recipients. In this last group, we
can see a difference of 10 p.p in group 1 and to 16 p.p. in group 3 betweenthe survival probabilities, at
two months before benefits cease.
The behaviourof individualsaged45or overis clearlydifferentsinceit movesintheoppositedirection.
The new social protection system, especially the possibility of taking retirement early, implies a signifi-
cant increase in the exit rate of these individuals from insured unemployment, mainly for long spell
durations.
On the whole,wecan see that the individualseligibleto UB werethose whosebehaviouradjusted less
in responseto the newinsurancesystem.The longmaximumentitlementperiodsthat theycouldenjoy
even before the change, by applyingfor USB-UB, could wellhave conditioned their behaviour, making
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Chart 3 (continued)
SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT SOCIAL BENEFIT RECIPIENTS, BY AGE GROUPthem indifferent to extensions in the maximum benefit entitlement periods which varied between 1
month and 14 months in 1999. Even so, we found that the most part of the individuals who see their
benefits extended remain in insured unemployment until they complete the additional time span.
Lastly, it is important to underline the fact that we do not observe any reaction from the individuals, in





unemployedat labour market and secondly because there are individual characteristics, such as level
of schooling, that influence the exit rate from insured unemployment. Furthermore, the results drawn
from longer durations have possibly a higher degree of uncertainty because fewer observations are
used in survival probability estimates.
The expectedrelationbetweenthe maximumbenefit entitlementperiodsand the survival probabilityin
insured unemployment is displayed in chart 4. The longer the maximum entitlement period, the higher
is the individuals’survival probability in insured unemployment for a particular duration. Nevertheless,
wecannotignorethe fact that age also has a negativeimpact on exitfrom unemploymentand worsens
the survival probability in unemployment even more. Addison and Portugal (2003), using the Inquérito
ao Emprego (Labour Force Survey) from the National Statistics Institute, conclude that exit rates from
unemployment in Portugal indeed decrease with age.
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE 2003 LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Within the context of the ESPP, we intend to establish if individual working decisions changed with the
possibility that those age 55 or over at unemployment date could take retirement at 58. The selected
sample is therefore composed of all unemployment insurance spells of individuals aged 45 years old
or over started around 1 March 2003, the date at which the ESPP came into force (March 2002 to
February 2004).
As in the section 4 analysis,weuse the “Difference-in-Difference” method. Howeverin this case, there
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Chart 4
SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1999 LEGISLATIVE CHANGEis only one control group, embracing all recipients between 45 and 54 years old at claim date, and a
single treatment group, embracing the remaining insured unemployedwhoare the potential beneficia-
ries of the measure. The unemployment insurance claims put in before 1 March 2003 make up the
group termed “before the ESPP” and the claims put in after that date make up the group termed “after
the ESPP”.
The variable in this section will be the ratio between the insured unemployed flow and the employed
population.The numberof employeesin eachmonth andyearwasfoundfrom the Inquéritoao Empre-
go (Labour Force Survey) carried out by the National Statistics Institute.
The monthlyevolutionof thisratiofrom March2002to February2004ispresentedinchart5, wherewe
see that the incidence values for the control group are always lower than the incidence values for the
treatment group. The months of January 2003 and January 2004 are characterized by high ratios.
However, these are seasonal since they are observed in both groups. The only important difference
betweenthe control group and the treatment group occurs at the end of 2002/beginningof 2003. In the
over-55 group the relative incidencein Januaryof 2003, even if seasonal,explodesin comparison with
the November 2002 value. This behaviour is not observed in the control group and could therefore be
interpretedasareactiontothepossibilityoftakingretirementearly, sincetheywillhavetobeentitledto
benefit to take advantage of this measure. From the chart we still see some smaller differences be-
tween groups, specifically around the month at which the programme was implemented and in the pe-
riod that elapses between November 2003 and January 2004. On the whole, the results suggest that
there was not a big reaction from the individuals to the fact that pensionable age had gone down.
Lastly, in table 5 we present the results for average incidence of insured unemployment as a percent-
age of the employed population. In column (6) there is a calculation of the first “difference” in average
incidence. The aim is to take out the effects inherent in the group from the possible impact of ESPP as
itcomesintoforce.Thedifferencepresentedincolumn(7)attemptstoeliminatefromtheimpacttheef-
fects common to the groups, mainly the changes in labour market conditions. This last column identi-
fies the impact on average incidence stemming from the reduction in the pensionable age to 58.
The group embracing the recipients aged between 45 and 54 is a control group and therefore any os-
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MONTHLY INCIDENCE OF INSURED
UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
EMPLOYED POPULATION
Chart 5cillation in average incidence is due to changes in the labour market. This group is represented in the
last row of table 5 and presents, in both periods, an average incidence lower than the average inci-
dence of the treatment group. The three differences computed suggest an increase in average inci-
dence; however we can see that the changes in labour market conditions and the impact of early
retirement on average incidence are not statistically significant. This leads us to conclude that the po-
tential recipients of the measure under analysis did not change their working decisions significantly.
There wouldseem to be twofactors justifyingthis result: over access conditionsrestrictive and the fact
that this measure is already set out in previous legislation.
6. CONCLUSION




age groups. Because we did not observe repeated spells of unemployment during the period under
analysis,theempiricalevidenceisquiteclearasto themagnitudeof thisrelationship.It isthereforeap-
parent that unemployment insurance generosity produces undesired effects regarding the move to
employment. This fact inevitably leads us to a question mark over the suitability of the current
unemployment protection system.
The higher increases due to changes in maximum entitlement periods occurred in the younger age
groups with magnitudes varying as a function of the type of benefits. In turn, in the group with longer
professional experience, the increase in the maximum entitlement periods did not necessarilyresult in
a decrease in the exit rate from insured unemployment. For these individuals, we observe a single be-
haviour pattern characterized by a decrease in the duration of the insured unemployment spells, justi-
fied partially by the possibility of taking the retirement early. These different situations reflect the fact
that there was a differentiated impact of the legislative change on the duration of insured
unemployment according to the type of benefit and to the claimant’s age.
As for the effect on job decisions stemming from the possibility of taking retirement early, included in
ESPP, the results suggest that there is no evidence to show a significant relationship. Fundamentally,
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Table 5











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 55 Treatment Average Incidence (%) 0,79 0,95 0,16 0.09
(Standard Deviation) (0,049) (0,046) (0,067) (0,07)
[45;55[ Control Average Incidence (%) 0,61 0,68 0,07 -
(Standard Deviation) (0,037) (0,031) (0,049) -
Note:(a)Own calculations based on information provided by the Instituto de Informática e Estatística da Segurança Social (IIESS) and Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), Inquérito
ao Emprego.wecanconcludethattheminimalassociationisduetothefactthatthetimespanchosentoassessthis
changewasnottheideal,sincethepreviouslegalframeworkonthissubjectalreadyallowedthepossi-
bility of early retirement for the insured unemployed.
The extension of some of these conclusions to the labour market in general is tempting but incorrect.
First unemploymentin an economyis not onlyinsured unemployment.Second because, as discussed
above, the behaviour of insured unemployed is not the same as that of non-insured unemployed. The
latter in particular have fewerincentives to remain unemployedbecause they are not entitled to unem-
ploymentinsuranceand therefore their job search pattern is different from that of insuredunemployed.
This situation is reflected in the different exit rates from unemployment.
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